

Lecture 1

a review of first-order logic

prerequisites

If you need to recall basics of first-order logic see the literature recommended for the

Introduction to Mathematical Logic

course at

www.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~krajicek/ml.html

I particularly recommend the lecture notes by *Lou van den Dries* available from this page.

FO logic:

- languages (terms, formulas, sentences, ...)
- structures
- satisfiability relation
- theories and their models
- the Completeness and the Compactness theorems
- definable sets and functions

language L

Vocabulary:

- set C_L of constants: c, d, \dots
- set R_L of relation symbols: R, S, \dots , each coming with arity $n_R \geq 1$
- set F_L of function symbols: f, g, \dots , each coming with arity $n_f \geq 1$

Common symbols:

- equality $=$
- logical connectives: $\vee, \wedge, \neg, \rightarrow, \equiv, \dots$
- variables x, y, \dots
- quantifiers \exists and \forall
- brackets of various types: $(,), [,], \dots$

L-terms

terms:

- variables are terms,
- if s_1, \dots, s_k are terms and $f \in F_L$ of arity k then

$$f(s_1, \dots, s_k)$$

is a term,

- only strings obtained by a finite number of applications of these rules are terms.

Notation:

$$t(x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

means that all variables occurring in t are among x_1, \dots, x_n

L-formulas

formulas:

- **atomic formulas:**
 - $t = s$, where t, s are any terms,
 - $R(t_1, \dots, t_k)$, where $n_R = k$ and t_i are terms.
- formulas are closed under logical connectives; $(\varphi \vee \psi), (\varphi \wedge \psi), \dots$,
- quantifiers: if φ is a formula, so are $(\exists x\varphi)$ and $(\forall x\varphi)$,
- only strings obtained in a finite nb. of steps via rules above are formulas.

There are always formulas, even if the vocabulary of L is empty.

Ex.:

$$x = y \text{ or } (\forall x x \neq x)$$

occurrences of variables

A variable x may have **free** occurrence in a formula, as in

$$x = x \quad \text{or} \quad \exists y \ x \neq y$$

or **bounded** (= closed), as in

$$\forall x \exists y \ x < y \quad \text{or} \quad \exists x \ x \neq 0$$

Remarks:

- interpret free as meaning "free for substitution"
- x in a quantifier is not assigned either qualification

sentences: formulas without any free occurrence of a variable

Notation: $\varphi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ means that all variables with some free occurrence are among x_1, \dots, x_n

theories

L-theory: a set of L -sentences (called *axioms*)

Ex. **LO** - linear orders

Axioms: the universal closures of formulas

- $\neg x < x$
- $(x < y \wedge y < z) \rightarrow x < z$
- $x < y \vee x = y \vee y < x$

Ex.: **DLO** - dense linear orders: LO plus

$$x < y \rightarrow \exists z (x < z \wedge z < y)$$

L-structures

Ex.: the ordered real closed field:

$$\mathbf{R} = (R, 0, 1, +, \cdot, <)$$

R : the set of reals

$0, 1, +, \cdot, <$: usual meaning

Ex. the countable dense linear order

$$(Q, <)$$

rationals Q with their usual ordering $<$

When we target a particular structure or a class of structures it is customary to use symbols that are established. I.e.:

- we use $+$ for addition and not $x \circ y$ or $f(x, y)$
- we use $<$ for ordering and not just generic $R(x, y)$

L -structures

a general L -structure

$$\mathbf{A} = (A, c^{\mathbf{A}}, \dots, R^{\mathbf{A}}, \dots, f^{\mathbf{A}}, \dots)$$

where

$A \neq \emptyset$ is the universe

and $c^{\mathbf{A}}, \dots, R^{\mathbf{A}}, \dots, f^{\mathbf{A}}, \dots$ interpret L :

- $c^{\mathbf{A}} \in A$
- $R^{\mathbf{A}} \subseteq A^k$, if $n_R = k$
- $f^{\mathbf{A}} : A^k \rightarrow A$, if $n_f = k$

Remark: we often skip the superscript \mathbf{A} in $c^{\mathbf{A}}$, etc, when there is no danger of a confusion.

term evaluation

Each term $t(\bar{x})$, where $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, determines

$$t^{\mathbf{A}} : A^n \rightarrow A$$

which is defined by induction on the (syntactic) complexity of t :

- for t a constant this is determined by the interpretation of L
- for $t = f(s_1(\bar{x}), \dots, s_k(\bar{x}))$ define for $\bar{a} \in A^n$ the value by composition:

$$t^{\mathbf{A}}(\bar{a}) := f^{\mathbf{A}}(s_1^{\mathbf{A}}(\bar{a}), \dots, s_k^{\mathbf{A}}(\bar{a}))$$

satisfiability relation

Definition (Tarski)

For L , \mathbf{A} , $\varphi(\bar{x})$ and $\bar{a} \in A^n$ define the **satisfiability relation**

$$\mathbf{A} \models \varphi(\bar{a})$$

by induction on the complexity of φ :

- $\mathbf{A} \models t(\bar{a}) = s(\bar{a})$ iff $t^{\mathbf{A}}(\bar{a}) = s^{\mathbf{A}}(\bar{a})$
- $\mathbf{A} \models R(\bar{a})$ iff $\bar{a} \in R^{\mathbf{A}}$
- \models commutes with logical connectives:
 $\mathbf{A} \models \varphi(\bar{a}) \wedge \psi(\bar{a})$ iff $\mathbf{A} \models \varphi(\bar{a})$ and $\mathbf{A} \models \psi(\bar{a})$, etc.
- $\mathbf{A} \models \exists y \varphi(\bar{a}, y)$ iff there is $b \in A$ s.t. $\mathbf{A} \models \varphi(\bar{a}, b)$
and analogously for \forall

models of theories

Definition - models

A is a **model** of theory T iff

$$\mathbf{A} \models \theta$$

for all axioms $\theta \in T$.

T having a model is **satisfiable**, otherwise it is **unsatisfiable**.

Ex. $(\mathbb{N}, <)$ is a model of LO but not of DLO while $(\mathbb{Q}, <)$ is a model of DLO.

Definition - logical consequence

A formula $\varphi(\bar{x})$ is a **logical consequence of** (or is logically implied by) theory T iff the universal closure $\forall \bar{x} \varphi(\bar{x})$ holds in every model of T .

Notation: $T \models \varphi$.

provability

How else can we establish logical consequences of T ? By **proofs** in predicate calculus:

$$\psi_1, \dots, \psi_\ell (= \varphi)$$

such that each formula ψ_i is

- an axiom of propositional logic, quantifier ax., ax. of equality or of T ,
- or follows from some earlier formulas ψ_j by one of inference rules.

Ex. of axioms: $\alpha \vee \neg\alpha$, $\bar{x} = \bar{y} \rightarrow f(\bar{x}) = f(\bar{y})$,
 $\varphi(t) \rightarrow \exists y\varphi(x)$ (subject to a condition on t), etc.

Ex. of rules:

$$\frac{\alpha \quad \alpha \rightarrow \beta}{\beta} \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{\eta \rightarrow \psi(x)}{\eta \rightarrow \forall x\psi(x)}$$

the key thms

Notation: $T \vdash \varphi$ iff T proves φ .

Completeness thm - Gödel 1930

$$T \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } T \models \varphi.$$

Alternatively: S is unsatisfiable iff S is inconsistent (proves everything).

A key corollary for logic and for model theory in particular:

Compactness thm. - Gödel, Mal'tsev

$T \models \varphi$ iff there is a **finite** $T_0 \subseteq T$ such that $T_0 \models \varphi$.

Alternatively: S is unsatisfiable iff there is a **finite** $S_0 \subseteq S$ that is unsatisfiable.

definable sets

When studying the real closed field in geometry or analysis we often consider more functions and relations than are those in the language: continuous or analytic f's, all open subsets of some R^n , ...
How can this be treated in FO logic? The **key notion** is:

Definable sets and functions

A subset $U \subseteq A^n$ is **definable** in \mathbf{A} iff there is a formula

$$\psi(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) ,$$

with $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and $\bar{z} = (z_1, \dots, z_t)$ and $\bar{b} \in A^t$ (= parameters) s.t. for all $\bar{a} \in A^n$:

$$\bar{a} \in U \text{ iff } \mathbf{A} \models \psi(\bar{a}, \bar{b}) .$$

A function $h : A^k \rightarrow A$ is definable iff its graph is definable.

definable in \mathbf{R}

Ex. Sets definable in \mathbf{R} = semialgebraic sets.

There is a **trade-off**:

- bigger language implies
- more definable sets and functions
- hence more interesting objects are included
- **but** if the language is too big we cannot obtain a sensible information about the definable sets and functions and may end-up in - essentially - the set theoretic world.

This we do not want: many set-theoretic properties of general sets and functions (even on reals) are not decidable by axioms of contemporary mathematics (= ZFC) and, more importantly, the geometric and algebraic flavor of model theory gets lost.

Ex.: the set-theoretic cardinality of a set versus the topological notion of Euler characteristic