

The "H-coefficients" Technique in a Nutshell

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Introduction

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 - D outputs a bit - 1 denoting that $R \in \Omega_{Real}$, 0 otherwise.

Advantage

- Define advantage of distinguisher D on cryptosystem \mathcal{Z} :

$$\text{Adv}^{\mathcal{Z}}(D) = \Pr \left[R \in \Omega_{\text{Real}} \ \& \ D^R = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[R \in \Omega_{\text{Random}} \ \& \ D^R = 1 \right]$$

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- We are really interested in resource bounded advantage independent on distinguishers, which can be defined like this:

$$\text{Adv}_q^{\mathcal{Z}} = \max_D \text{Adv}_q^{\mathcal{Z}}(D).$$

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- Similarly denote Y the probability distribution on views induced by *Random* oracles.

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- Therefore V is now the set of all obtainable views

Statistical Distance

Denote $\Delta(X, Y)$ the statistical distance (also called total variation):

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta(X, Y) &= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\nu \in V} |\Pr[X = \nu] - \Pr[Y = \nu]|, \\ &= \sum_{\nu: \Pr[Y=\nu] > \Pr[X=\nu]} \Pr[Y = \nu] - \Pr[X = \nu], \\ &= \sum_{\nu: \Pr[X=\nu] > \Pr[Y=\nu]} \Pr[X = \nu] - \Pr[Y = \nu].\end{aligned}$$

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- Since D is deterministic, D 's decision is based only on view that it produces during experiment.
- That implies D 's advantage can be rewritten as:

$$\Pr[D(X) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y) = 1].$$

The Ratio

- Now let's transform statistical distance into something more useful.

$$\Delta(X, Y) = \sum_{\nu: \Pr[Y=\nu] > \Pr[X=\nu]} \Pr[Y = \nu] - \Pr[X = \nu]$$

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Good and Bad Views

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- We are free to define classes V_1, V_2 as we like.
- It is very useful to have one big class for which is the ratio close to one (those would be called "good" views) and a smaller class for which the ratio is large (call these the "bad" views").

Then the following holds:

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Epsilons

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- and finally

$$\mathbb{E}_{\nu \in Y} [\dots] \geq \Pr[Y \in V_1] (1 - \epsilon_1) + \Pr[Y \in V_2] (1 - \epsilon_2).$$

Good and Bad Views part 2

Then we can conclude proposition 5, because:

$$\Delta(X, Y) = 1 - \mathbb{E}_{\nu \in Y} \left[\min \left(1, \frac{\Pr[X = \nu]}{\Pr[Y = \nu]} \right) \right],$$

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The Main Result

- If we now conclude that V_1 is "large" therefore $\Pr[Y \in V_1]$ is approx 1 and that ϵ_2 is also close to one we immediately obtain the main result:

$$\text{Adv}(D) \leq \Delta(X, Y) \leq \epsilon_1 + \Pr[Y \in V_2].$$

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- It translates to: Advantage is upper-bounded by probability of "bad" views in ideal world plus the distance between the ratio and one.

Lower Bounding the Ratio

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- However it implies that when D produced ν compatible with R then when D interacts with R it produces ν as well.

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- The response from R_2 is also the same, since it is compatible with ν
- By induction D produces the same view when interacting with R_2

Central Insight

Given view ν :

$$\Pr[X = \nu] = \frac{|\text{comp}_{\Omega_{Real}}(\nu)|}{|\Omega_{Real}|} \text{ and } \Pr[Y = \nu] = \frac{|\text{comp}_{\Omega_{Random}}(\nu)|}{|\Omega_{Random}|}.$$

Consequences

Right from the definition of compatibility and the central insight we get:

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Right from the definition of compatibility and the central insight we get:

- 1 The order in which queries appear in a view ν does not affect the probability of ν occurring, only the set of queries does.
- 2 If two different deterministic distinguishers can obtain ν with nonzero probability they would obtain ν with equal probability (even if the order of queries differs).

Reformulate the ratio

We can therefore transform the ratio:

$$\frac{\Pr[X = \nu]}{\Pr[Y = \nu]} = \frac{|\Omega_{Random}| |\text{comp}_{\Omega_{Real}}|}{|\Omega_{Real}| |\text{comp}_{\Omega_{Random}}|}$$

Thank you for your attention.
Do you have any questions?